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Abstract
This paper studies lying in a novel context. Previous work has focused on situations in
which people are either fully aware of the economic consequences of all available actions (e.g.,
die-under-cup paradigm), or they are uncertain, but this uncertainty cannot be cleared in any
way (e.g., sender-receiver game). On the contrary, in reality, people oftentimes know that they
will have a chance to lie, they are initially uncertain about the economic consequences of the
available actions, but they can invest resources (e.g., time) to find them out. Here we capture
the essence of this type of situations by means of a novel decision problem. Two experiments
provide evidence of four empirical regularities regarding the distribution of choices, and suggest
that participants vary along two dimensions: the moral cost of lying, and the cost of investing
time to find out the payoffs associated to the available actions. Taking inspiration from these
observations, we introduce a model that is consistent with the main empirical results.
Journal of Economic Literature classification codes: C70, C92, D03.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
The conflict between honesty and dishonesty is at the core of all economic and social interactions
that involve communication with asymmetric information. In these situations, people have the
opportunity to misreport their private pieces of information. Dishonesty clearly has negative impact
on government and companies. For example, every year, tax evasion costs about $100 billion to
the U.S. government (Gravelle, 2009), and insurance fraud costs more than $40 billion to insurance
companies1.
In the past decade, economists and psychologists have started studying (dis)honesty using incen-
tivized economic problems (Erat and Gneezy, 2012; Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi, 2013; Gneezy,
2005; Hurkens and Kartik, 2009; Kartik, 2009; Levine and Schweitzer, 2014, 2015; Mazar et al., 2008;
Sheremeta and Shields, 2013; Weisel and Shalvi, 2015; Wiltermuth, 2011). For example, they have
explored the effect on honesty of many exogenous and endogenous variables, such as: demographic
characteristics (Abeler et al., 2019; Biziou-van Pol et al., 2015; Cappelen et al., 2013; Capraro, 2018;
Childs, 2012; Dreber and Johannesson, 2008; Friesen and Gangadharan, 2012; Erat and Gneezy,
2012); social and moral preferences (Biziou-van Pol et al., 2015; Levine and Schweitzer, 2014, 2015;
Shalvi and De Dreu, 2014); incentives (Dreber and Johannesson, 2008; Erat and Gneezy, 2012;
Ezquerra et al., 2018; Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi, 2013; Gneezy, 2005; Gneezy et al., 2018; Ka-
jackaite and Gneezy, 2017; Mazar et al., 2008); and cognitive mode (Andersen et al., 2018; Cappelen
et al., 2013; Capraro, 2017; Capraro et al., 2019; Gino et al., 2011; Gunia et al., 2012; Lohse et al.,
2018; Shalvi et al., 2012).
While differing in important details, all these experiments share a common property: they are
static, in the sense that they focus either on situations in which people are fully aware of the
consequences of all available options, or on situations for which there is uncertainty about the
consequences of the options, but this uncertainty cannot be cleared in any way (that is, there is
no room for learning the consequences of the available actions). To be more precise, one set of
studies (e.g., Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013)) implements a die-under-cup paradigm, in which
1See https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/insurance-fraud/insurance fraud
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participants roll a die privately (under a cup), and then are asked to report the outcome, knowing
that they would be paid according to the reported number. Since participants know the outcome
of the die and know the payoff function, they are fully aware of the consequences of all available
actions. The other set (e.g., Gneezy (2005)), instead, implements a sender-receiver game, in which
a person, named sender, is given a private information and is asked to report it to another person,
the receiver, whose role is to guess the original piece of information given to the sender. The payoffs
of both the sender and the receiver depend on whether the receiver guesses the original piece of
information. Since the sender has no way to know whether or not the receiver is going to believe
his message, the sender has no way to clear the uncertainty about the economic consequences of his
available actions2.
Therefore, although important, these studies provide an incomplete picture as, in reality, people
oftentimes make decisions within a dynamic setting in which they know that they will have a
chance to tell the truth or lie, but they do not initially know the exact material consequences of
these actions. They have to invest resources (e.g., time) to find them out.
Many real situations are, at their core, dynamic in this sense. For example, before starting their
tax declaration, people know that they are going to have the chance to lie (or misrepresent some
facts of their declaration) in order to pay less taxes; however, they do not initially know how much
money they would save for each possible lie they could tell.
In this work, we capture the essence of this type of situations by means of a novel decision
problem, in which participants, after being informed that they will have a chance to report a piece
of information either truthfully or not (several different ways to misreport the piece of information
will be possible), and before actually choosing how to report that piece of information, need to
2There are also studies implementing a sender-receiver game in which the receiver makes no choice (e.g., Biziou-van
Pol et al. (2015); Capraro (2017); Capraro et al. (2019)). In this case, there is no uncertainty at all and, consequently,
these studies belong to the previous class of studies, in which subjects are fully aware of the consequences of the
available actions. There are also studies in which subjects perform a task and then are paid according to the self-
reported score in the task (Mazar et al., 2008; Gino et al., 2013). In this case, either there is no uncertainty regarding
the payoffs associated to the available actions or, if there is an uncertainty, for example regarding one’s own real
score, this uncertainty cannot be clear. Therefore, also these studies belong to the previously mentioned classes.
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invest time to explore the payoffs associated to the available strategies.
This decision problem turns out to be particularly interesting also because it opens the way
to a completely new set of empirical questions. Indeed, most previous experimental studies on
deception implement either binary decision problems — in which subjects get to choose between
two strategies, one corresponding to telling the truth and one corresponding to lying (Biziou-van
Pol et al., 2015; Capraro, 2017; Gunia et al., 2012) — or decision problems in which there are many
different ways to lie, but finding which lie maximizes the payoff is trivial (Cappelen et al., 2013; Erat
and Gneezy, 2012; Gneezy, 2005; Shalvi et al., 2012; Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi, 2013; Sheremeta
and Shields, 2013). On the contrary, in our case, decision makers can lie in several different ways:
they can explore all potential payoffs and then report the piece of information that corresponds to
the global maximum; or they can explore only some payoffs and then report a piece of information
that corresponds to an early local maximum (a local maximum that can be found easily and quickly
— to be properly defined later); or they can explore the payoff corresponding to reporting the truth
and then decide to lie only if this payoff is low (in case they decide to lie, they can do it in at least
two ways: they can choose the global maximum or they “can stretch the truth”, by looking around
the truth in search of a profitable deviation); subjects can even be indifferent and pick one choice
at random.
To shed light on how people make decisions in this context, we conduct two experiments, Study
1 and Study 2 (see Section 3, Section 4, and Section 5). These experiments provide evidence of
four major results: (i) Very few participants stretch the truth; (ii) There is a significant proportion
of participants that report the truth without first finding out its corresponding payoff; (iii) Among
participants who decide to find out the payoff corresponding to telling the truth, this payoff is
positively correlated with honesty; (iv) If there is a very high payoff (but smaller than the global
maximum) that participants can find easily and quickly, then a significant proportion of participants
report the piece of information corresponding to this very high payoff.
These results suggest that participants vary in (at least) two dimensions: the moral cost of lying,
and the cost of finding out payoffs. In Section 6 we follow this idea and we introduce a model.
According to this model, participants sequentially choose whether to report a piece of information
5
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at time t or to pay a cost to reveal one payoff at time t + 1. The utility is assumed to depend on
the payoff corresponding to the reported information, the moral cost of lying (that is paid only if a
participant decides to lie), and the cumulative cost of finding out payoffs. We show that this model
is consistent with the four empirical regularities listed above.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Overview of the experimental design
Our goal is to build a decision problem that allows us to study how people make decisions in
situations in which they know that they will have a chance to lie, but they do not initially know the
economic consequences of the available actions. Perhaps the simplest way to do this is as follows.
Participants are given a list of payoffs that are initially covered. Then they are given, as private
information, a “position”. Finally, their are told that their job is to report the given position, and
that they will be paid the amount of money corresponding to the position they report. In this way,
participants are incentivized to look for the position corresponding to the maximum payoff and
report that position. (Note that it is important to ask participants to report the position, and not
the payoff in that position, otherwise it would not be possible to make “blind” decisions, that is,
decisions without knowing the corresponding payoff). At this point, participants can either report
a position without finding out any payoff, or can invest time to sequentially uncover some or all
payoffs. This design certainly has a number of positive features. For example, it would allow us
to see the number of payoffs uncovered by the participants before reporting a position. This, in
particular, would allow us to know with certainty whether a participant reports a position with
or without knowing the corresponding payoff. Yet, this design also has an important drawback.
Previous work suggests that actively finding out the economic consequences of the available actions is
perceived, by observers, as a signal of selfishness (Capraro and Kuilder, 2016; Jordan et al., 2016).
This implies that pro-social participants might be particularly reluctant to actively uncover the
payoffs. To avoid this potential problem, we opted for keeping the same decision problem structure,
but, instead of giving participants the list of payoffs covered, we give it to them already uncovered.
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Note that, in this case, participants still need to invest time to find the payoff corresponding to
each position they might report, because they have to count up to the position corresponding to the
desired payoff. Therefore, the key point of the decision problem remains intact. Moreover, we avoid
the problem that pro-social participants might be particularly reluctant to explore the payoffs. But
clearly this comes with a price: we will not be able to directly see whether participants make a
decision with or without knowing the payoff corresponding to telling the truth. In Study 1, we
address this point by putting the given position late in the list and by analyzing response times.
The idea (supported by the results, as it will be discussed later) is that fast participants are less
likely than slow participants to have found out the payoff corresponding to telling the truth.
3 Study 1
3.1 Procedure
We recruited participants on the online platform Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). AMT experi-
ments are easy and cheap because participants attend from their homes by simply completing an
online incentivized survey that takes no more than a few minutes. This allows researchers to sig-
nificantly decrease the stakes of the experiment, without compromising the results. Several studies
have indeed shown that data gathered using AMT are of no less quality than data gathered using
the standard physical lab (Arechar et al., 2018; Berinsky et al., 2012; Goodman et al., 2013; Horton
et al., 2011; Mason and Suri, 2012; Paolacci et al., 2010; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014). Moreover,
as an upside with respect to standard laboratory experiments, AMT experiments use samples that
are more heterogeneous than the standard laboratory experiments, that are typically conducted
using a pool of students (Berinsky et al., 2012; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014).
After entering their Turk ID, participants were told that they will generate two pieces of infor-
mation:
• A position, which will be a number, for example 14.
• A list of potential payoffs between 1 and 90 cents, such as:
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23 73 34 22 2 11 54 21 44 3 22 6 89 45 67 23 65 46 77 1 86 5 4
All the payoffs were shown on the same line, divided by two spaces.
Participants were told that their payoff will be equal to the number in the given position. Thus,
in this case, it would be 45 cents, because 45 is in position 14. (We chose this particular example,
because the payoff is essentially equal to the expected payoff from a random sequence, which is 45.5
cents — we wanted to avoid priming participants towards being lucky or unlucky).
Then we told participants that their job will be to report the position they generated. We made
it clear that the survey was anonymous and that, at the moment in which participants report their
position, we do not know the position they generated.3 After these general instructions, participants
answered six comprehension questions with mock positions and mock lists. The positions and the
lengths of the mock lists were all different, in order to avoid that the participants get used to finding
the payoff associated with telling the truth without actually counting, and to avoid that they count
backwards. Only participants who answered correctly all questions were allowed to proceed to
the real experiment. Comprehension questions included questions about payoff maximization. So,
participants who passed this attention test were aware of the fact that they could increase their
payoff by misreporting the position they generated.
After the comprehension questions, participants were told that the real experiment was about
to start, they were reminded that they will generate a position and a list of potential payoffs, and
that their payoff for the survey will be equal to the number in the position they report. Then we
asked them to press the next button to start playing.
In the next screen, participants were randomly divided in two treatments. In the Lucky condition,
they were communicated that the position they generated was 22; in the Unlucky condition, they
were communicated that the position they generated was 19.4 Participants were asked to take
3This is not deception: participants were randomly assigned to different positions by a computer program and we
could find out the position corresponding to a given participant only at the end of the survey.
4The reason why the first condition is called Lucky while the second one is called Unlucky will be clear in the
next paragraph. Clearly, the words Lucky and Unlucky were not used in the instructions: participants were only
communicated their position.
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note of this position on a piece of paper, and then to press the next button to generate the list of
potential payoffs.5
In the following screen, all participants were shown the same list of potential payoffs, which was:
25 3 63 54 28 70 37 36 26 31 43 15 30 60 33 37 15 63 16 50 4 71 79 2 85 48
Then, participants were asked to report the position they generated.6 We took a measure of
response time using a timer. The timer was not visible to participants.
Before moving on, we make two observations about the list of potential payoffs. First, if partic-
ipants in the Unlucky condition report the true position, then they get only 16 cents (because 16
is in position 19); if participants in the Lucky condition report the true position, then they get 71
cents (because 71 is in position 22), which is close to the maximum available payoff, which is 85
cents. This is why the former condition is named Unlucky, whereas the latter is named Lucky. Sec-
ond, both Position 19 and Position 22 (the true positions) are adjacent to positions with a greater
payoff. Thus, both lucky and unlucky participants can “stretch the truth” and get a greater payoff
very easily (unlucky participants can increase their payoff by 47 cents or 34 cents, if they report
Position 18 or Position 20, instead of their true position; similarly, lucky participants can increase
their payoff very easily (by 8 cents) by reporting Position 23, instead of their true position). In
other words: conditional on finding out the payoff corresponding to telling the truth, reporting the
5We chose to ask participants to take note of their position on a piece of paper in order to avoid that participants
forget their position and end up lying not because they want to, but because they do not remember their position.
We were particularly concerned with this point because participants in the next screen will face the list of payoffs
and therefore might confuse the position (which is a number) with the payoffs (other numbers).
6We also conducted a Time Pressure condition, in which participants were asked to report their position within
15 seconds (median response time in the baseline). The reason why we also tested this condition is because there is
a standing debate about whether honesty is intuitive or requires deliberation (Capraro, 2017; Capraro et al., 2019;
Gunia et al., 2012; Lohse et al., 2018; Shalvi et al., 2012), and we wanted to see whether cognitive process would
also matter in our case. It would not. We found that time pressure has no effect on honesty, although it has quite
an obvious effect on the distribution of reported positions: it switches some would-be global maximizers into local
maximizers, and it generates a small proportion of confused subjects. We report the analysis in the Appendix.
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true position is essentially as easy as lying. Also this property is crucial: it allows us to avoid having
subjects who, after finding out the payoff corresponding to telling the truth, prefer telling the truth
over lying only because telling the truth is easier than lying.
After reporting the position, subjects were asked standard demographic questions (sex, age,
education) and then they were given the completion code needed to submit the survey to AMT and
claim for the payment.
We refer to the Appendix for full experimental instructions.
3.2 Results
Participants
We recruited 400 participants located in the US. As it is usual in AMT experiments, in case of
multiple observations (defined as those with either the same TurkID or the same IP address) we kept
only the first observation (as determined by the starting date) and discarded the rest. Moreover,
we excluded from the analysis participants who submitted the survey without completing it and
participants who failed one or more comprehension questions. After this procedure, we were left
with 347 valid observations (mean age = 36.8, females = 45.8%). The proportion of participants
that has been eliminated is in line with previous research using similar games (Horton et al., 2011).
Distribution of reported positions in Study 1.
Figure 1 plots the histogram of the reported positions. Note that Position 19 and Position 22
correspond to the true positions in the Unlucky and Lucky conditions, respectively. Therefore,
the majority of people acted honestly (overall rate of honesty = 84.1%). This is in line with a
recent meta-analysis, arguing that people lie surprisingly little in economic experiments (Abeler
et al., 2019). Regarding the liars, observe that Position 25 is the one corresponding to the global
maximum, while Position 3, Position 6, Position 18, and Position 23 correspond to the local maxima.
It follows that virtually all liars maximized their payoff (either locally or globally). Moreover, among
the 118 liars, only 10 chose to “stretch the truth”, by choosing a position adjacent to the true
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Figure 1: Histogram of the positions reported in Study 1.
position. In other words, 108 out of 118 liars (91.5%), either reported the position corresponding to
the global maximum, or reported a position corresponding to an early local maximum, where early
local maximum stands for positions 3 and 6.
Result 1. Very few participants stretch the truth, that is, the vast majority of participants
either report the true position or a position that is not adjacent to the true position; in this latter
case, they almost always report a position corresponding to a maximum (either global or local).
Heterogeneity in people’s decision-making
In this section, we explore whether participants find out the payoff corresponding to telling the
truth before reporting a position, or whether there are some participants who report a position
without first finding out the payoff corresponding to telling the truth. Apart from shedding light on
how people make decisions in our experiment, this would also help us understand whether investing
time to find out the payoffs has a cost for the participants.
To this end, we use response times. The idea is that participants who find out the payoff
corresponding to telling the truth will take less time to report a position compared to participants
who stop finding out the payoffs before reaching the payoff corresponding to telling the truth.
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Following this intuition, we divide subjects in two subsamples, by doing a median split on the
response times: we define Fast (Slow) participants as those who take shorter (longer) than the
median response time to report a position. Clearly, we do not expect this to be an exact measure:
there will be Slow subjects who did not find out the payoff corresponding to telling the truth;
conversely, there will be Fast subjects who found out the payoff corresponding to telling the truth.
However, as we now show, this turns out to be a useful proxy. To see this, we start with the
observation that, in line with previous literature, we expect that Unlucky subjects lie more than
Lucky subjects, because they have a larger incentive to lie (Gneezy, 2005; Gneezy et al., 2018).
We expect to see this effect also in our experiment, but only among subjects who found out the
payoff corresponding to telling the truth (because the other ones do not know whether they have
been lucky or not). Therefore, if, as we argue, most Fast participants did not find out the payoff
corresponding to telling the truth and most Slow participants found out the payoff corresponding
to telling the truth, then we would see that being Unlucky vs Lucky has an effect among Slow
participants but not among Fast participants.
This prediction is indeed supported by the data. Figure 2 reports the rate of honesty split by
whether they were Lucky or Unlucky and by response time (Fast participants vs Slow participants).
Fast participants in the Lucky condition behaved essentially the same as the Fast participants
in the Unlucky condition, and they were extremely honest (rate of honesty: 98.8% vs 96.7%; logit
regression without control: coeff = 1.02, z = 0.87, p = 0.383; with control: coeff = 1.14, z = 0.96, p
= 0.335). On the contrary, among Slow participants, Unlucky participants were way more dishonest
than Slow and Lucky ones (rate of honesty: 58.7% vs 84.1%; logit regression without control: coeff
= 1.32, z = 3.57, p < .001; with control: coeff = 1.30, z = 3.33, p = 0.001).
This suggests that, indeed, Fast participants were less likely than Slow participants to have
found out the payoff corresponding to telling the truth and that being lucky has a positive effect
on honesty, but only among participants who found out all the payoff corresponding to telling the
truth. Moreover, the fact that virtually all Fast participants were honest suggests that there is a
proportion of participants who tell the truth without first finding out its corresponding payoff.
12
4 LIMITATION OF STUDY 1
Figure 2: Rate of honesty among participants in Study 1, split by whether they were Lucky or
Unlucky and by response time (faster half vs slower half). Error bars represent standard errors of
the means.
Result 2. There is a proportion of participants who report the truth without first finding out
its corresponding payoff.
Result 3. Among participants who decide to find out the payoff corresponding to telling the
truth, this payoff has a positive effect on honesty.
4 Limitation of Study 1
Study 1 clearly shows that participants vary in their moral cost of lying: there is a proportion of
participants who report the truth without first finding out the corresponding payoff; and there is a
proportion of participants who first find out the payoff corresponding to telling the truth and then
lie only if this payoff is low.
However, in principle, the results of Study 1 can be explained by assuming that participants vary
only in the cost of lying, and that (virtually) all participants have zero cost of finding out payoffs.
To see this, assume that all participants have zero cost of finding out the payoffs and let λ(p) ≥ 0
be the individual parameter representing the moral cost of lying of participant p. If λ(p) is above a
13
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certain threshold λ∗, then p knows that s/he will tell the truth regardless of the corresponding payoff
(remember that participants know that their payoff is somewhere between 0 and 90 cents). Since
the cost of finding out payoffs is assumed to be 0, such a participant p will be indifferent between
finding out the payoffs or not and therefore, statistically, p will stop finding out the payoffs in the
middle of the list. If, instead, λ(p) < λ∗, it is optimal for p to find out all the payoffs. Therefore,
participants p with λ(p) < λ∗ will take longer to make a decision compared to participants with
λ(p) ≥ λ∗, because they have to find out all the payoffs. Moreover, participants with λ(p) < λ∗ will
either tell the truth or lie maximally, depending on whether their cost of lying counterbalance or
not the difference between the maximum available payoff and the payoff corresponding to telling the
truth. These predictions are in line with the results of Study 1, which indeed show that virtually
all participants either tell the truth or report the position corresponding to the global maximum
(note that almost no one reported a position corresponding to a local maximum), and that Fast
participants are way more honest than Slow participants. Therefore, the results of Study 1 can be
explained without assuming that investing time to find out the payoffs has a cost for the participants.
The goal of Study 2 is to show that a significant proportion of participants do have a non-zero
cost of finding out payoffs.
To do this, we observe that the main limitation of Study 1 is that there are no very high payoffs
at the beginning of the list. In Study 2, we consider a new list characterized by the fact that, at the
beginning, there is a very high payoff, which is however still smaller than the global maximum. The
rationale for considering this variant is the following. If also with this new list most participants
will either report the truth or report a position corresponding to the global maximum, then this
would be a indication that virtually all people have a zero-cost of finding out payoffs. If, instead, in
Study 2 a significant proportion of participants will report this high local maximum, this would be
an indication that a significant proportion of subjects have a non-zero cost of finding out payoffs.
Furthermore, in Study 2 we would like to bring additional evidence that there is a proportion
of participants who report the true position without first finding out its corresponding payoff. In
Study 1 this result was obtained indirectly by analyzing response times. In Study 2 we would
like to strengthen this result through an additional test. At the end of the experiment, we will ask
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participants to self-report whether they have read the list of the payoffs before making a decision, or
not. Then we will compare the behavior of those who respond that they have read the list of payoffs
with the behavior of those who respond that they have not. We are aware that non-incentivized
self-reported questions like this one have their limitations (e.g., participants are not incentivized to
answer and therefore they might respond at random). We indeed considered obtaining the same
information through an incentivized question, for example by incentivizing participants to report, at
the end of the survey, the payoff corresponding to their given position. However, we reasoned that
such a measure would generate a bias, such that liars who have looked at the payoff corresponding
to telling the truth would be hesitant to answer this question truthfully (even if it is incentivized),
because it would be an admission that they have lied. Therefore, it is possible that some liars who
have read the list would be classified as people who have not read the list. To avoid this bias we
decided to adopt the self-reported question. In the results section we will show that, although it is
a non-incentivized measure, it turns out to be reliable.
Finally, the third goal of Study 2 is to replicate the three main empirical regularities found in
Study 1. Replication is crucial to increase confidence that findings are not false positives, and it is
especially important now in light of the Replication Crisis in Psychology (Open Science Collabora-
tion, 2015).
5 Study 2
5.1 Experimental design and procedure
The design was identical to Study 1. There were only two differences. The first difference regarded
the list of potential payoffs. In Study 2 we used the following list:
65 87 27 36 62 20 53 54 64 59 47 75 60 30 57 53 75 27 16 40 86 71 11 88 5 42
We built this list as follows: apart from the payoffs corresponding to telling the truth in the
Lucky and Unlucky situations, that we kept constant with respect to Study 1, this list was built
15
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from the list in Study 1, by taking the complementary payoffs, that is, the payoffs in the list of
Study 2 were equal to ninety minus the corresponding payoff in the list of Study 1. Note that
this list fits our purpose: it contains a very high payoff at the beginning (87 in position 2), but
this payoff is strictly smaller than the global maximum, which is 88, in position 24. Moreover, the
payoffs corresponding to telling the truth are adjacent to larger payoffs. Indeed, in the Unlucky
condition, reporting Position 20 instead of the true Position 19 guarantees a payoff of 40 cents
instead of a payoff of 16 cents; similarly, in the Lucky condition, reporting Position 21 instead of
Position 22 guarantees a payoff of 86 cents instead of a payoff of 71 cents. Therefore, similarly to
Study 1, participants of Study 2 can “stretch the truth” very easily. Finally, the global maximum
is not adjacent to either of the positions corresponding to telling the truth.
The second difference with respect to Study 2 was that, after making their choice, participants
were asked: “‘Did you read the list before reporting the position?” They could answer either yes
or no.
5.2 Results
Participants
We recruited 200 participants on AMT, none of whom had participated in Study 1. After
eliminating multiple IP addresses, multiple TurkIDs, those who left the survey incomplete, and
those who failed the comprehension questions, we were left with N = 188 participants (mean age
= 34.3, females = 36.7%).
Distribution of reported positions
Figure 3 plots the histogram of the reported positions. As in Study 1, most subjects either
report the truth or report a maximum of the payoff function, either local or global. Only a minority
stretch the truth. More precisely, 30 subjects report position 2 (first local maximum), 1 subject
reports position 5 (second local maximum), 1 subject reports position 9 (third local maximum),
131 subjects report the truth, 6 subjects report position 21 (but only 2 of them participated in
16
5.2 Results 5 STUDY 2
the Lucky condition, and thus stretched the truth, according to our definition7), 1 subject reports
position 23 (which is actually a minimum, so this person probably made a mistake when counting),
18 subject report position 24 (the global maximum). Therefore, Result 1 in Study 1 is replicated.
Figure 3: Histogram of the positions reported in Study 2.
However, there is an important difference with respect to Study 1: while in Study 1 the third
most chosen position was the global maximum, here the third most chosen position is position 2,
which is a local but not global maximum. As mentioned in Section 4, this provides evidence that
some people do have a non-zero cost of finding out payoffs.
Another important difference with respect to Study 1 regards the rate of honesty. In Study 1 the
rate of honesty was 84.1%. In Study 2 the rate of honesty was 69.7%. Logit regression confirms that
the difference is significant (p < .001). We are aware that this logit regression is not formally correct,
because there is no random assignment between Study 1 and Study 2. We nevertheless believe that
it is an indication that lying is more pervasive in Study 2 than in Study 1. In retrospection, this is
not surprising: it is reasonable to think that participants with an “average” (but not zero) cost of
finding out payoffs and with an “average” (but not zero) cost of lying, would find out some payoffs
7Alternatively, one could define stretching the truth more flexibly, by including people who report a position one
or two positions away from the true position. Clearly, this does not change the qualitative results.
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and then lie only if, among the payoffs that they have found out, there is a very high payoff. As we
will see, this observation turns out to be a natural consequence of the model we present in Section
6.
Heterogeneity in participants’ decision-making
As in Study 1, in this section we aim to understand whether all participants find out the payoff
corresponding to telling the truth before reporting a position, or whether there is a proportion of
participants that report a position without first finding out the payoff corresponding to telling the
truth. As in Study 1, we start by splitting participants in the faster half and the slower half. Next
we will analyze the responses to the self-reported question: “Did you read the list before reporting
a position?”.
Figure 4 reports the rate of honesty among lucky and unlucky participants, split by whether they
responded fast or slow. The figure puts in evidence that, similarly to Study 1, the positive effect
of luck is present only among slow participants (p = 0.020) but not among fast participants (p
= 0.562). This suggests that, indeed, slow participants are more likely than fast participants to find
out the payoff corresponding to telling the truth (otherwise, the positive effect of luck on honesty
would have been present also among fast participants). There is, however, a major difference with
respect to Study 1. In Study 1 fast participants were almost exclusively honest (rate of honesty =
97.7%); in Study 2, the rate of honesty among fast participants appears to be quite smaller (80.8%).
To understand the reason of this difference, we look at the distribution of reported positions among
fast participants in Study 2. We find that virtually all fast liars (17 out of 18) report the local
maximum (Position 2); only one fast liar reports the global maximum. Therefore, while in Study 1
the Fast participants were virtually all honest; in Study 2, virtually all Fast participants are either
honest or report the early local maximum. This suggests that, in Study 1, some fast participants
actually read part of the list of the payoffs, but then reported the true position only because they
did not find a high payoff at the beginning of the list. In sum, this suggests being in the faster half
is not a proxy for not reading the list at all, but it is a proxy for reading part of the list.
The analysis of answers to the self-reported question “Did you read the list before reporting a
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Figure 4: Rate of honesty among participants in Study 2, split by whether they were Lucky or
Unlucky and by response time (faster half vs slower half). Error bars represent standard errors of
the means
position?” confirms this view. We find that only 21.2% of the participants declared that they did
not read the list. Among these participants, the rate of honesty was 87.5%, significantly higher
than the rate of honesty among participants who declared that they had read the list, which was
64.8% (p = 0.009). Moreover, all the liars who declared that they had not read the list reported
the local maximum (Position 2), except one who reported the next local maximum (Position 5).
Furthermore, the average response time among participants who declared that they had not read the
list (13.96s) was significantly smaller (p < .001) than the average response time among participants
who declared that they had read the list (24.85s). Taken together, these results suggest that the
answer to the question “Did you read the list before reporting a position?” was a reliable proxy for
participants who read part of the list.
We can now use these observations to show that Study 2 replicates also Result 2 and Result 3
of Study 1.
Result 2 stated that there is a significant proportion of participants who tell the truth without
first finding out its corresponding payoff. To provide support for this result also in Study 2, we look
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at participants who declared that they had not read the list. The average response time among
participants who reported the true position and then reported that they had not read the list
was significantly smaller than the average response time among participants who reported the true
position and then reported that they had read the list (12.46s vs 22.65s, p < .001). This provides a
first piece of evidence that participants who reported the true position and declared that they had
not read the list, reported the true position without first finding out its payoff corresponding. More
critically, we find that participants who reported the true position and then reported that they had
not read the list had a smaller response time than participants who did not report the true position
and then reported that they had not read the list (12.46s vs 24.30s, p = 0.025). Remembering that
these liars almost exclusively reported Position = 2, the fact that participants who reported the true
position take less time than these participants to report a position, suggests that most participants
who reported the true position and then answered that they did not read the list, did not even start
reading the list. This also implies that we can estimate that the proportion of subjects that report
the true position without reading the list is, in our sample, 18.55% (i.e., the proportion of honest
people who declared that they had not read the list).
Result 3 stated that, among participants who find out the payoff corresponding to telling the
truth, being lucky has a positive effect on honesty. To provide support for this result also in Study
2, we look at the effect of luck among participants who declared that they had read the list of
payoffs. As expected, among these participants, the rate of honesty among Lucky participants
was significantly higher than the rate of honesty among Unlucky participants (61.4% vs 38.5%, p
= 0.033). Note that the same positive effect of Luck on honesty is not present among participants
who declared that they had not read the list, in which case the results even trend in the opposite
direction (rates of honesty: 77.8% vs 95.4%, p = 0.231).
6 Model
The goal of this section is to develop a model that can explain the empirical results found in the
two experiments. We start by summarising these results in the next subsection. We then introduce
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an informal description of the model, which will help us guide through the formal development
made in the following subsection. Next, we report the analysis of the model, that we divide in five
propositions. Finally, we show that the model is consistent with the empirical results.
6.1 Summary of the empirical results
The first three results correspond to the results found in Study 1 and replicated in Study 2.
Result 1. Very few participants stretch the truth, that is, the vast majority of participants
either report the true position or a position that is not adjacent to the true position; in this latter
case, they almost always report a position corresponding to a maximum (either global or local).
Result 2. There is a significant proportion of participants who report the truth without first
finding out its corresponding payoff.
Result 3. Among the participants who find out the payoff corresponding to telling the truth,
luck has a positive effect on honesty (i.e., lucky participants lie less than unlucky participants).
The last result is the core finding of Study 2.
Result 4. If there is a very high potential payoff (but smaller than the global maximum) at the
beginning of the list, a substantial proportion of people report the position corresponding to this
high payoff.
6.2 Informal description of the model: A subdivision in nine types
Before developing its formal details, we think it is useful to provide an informal description of the
model.
In particular, here we observe that the former four results can be broadly explained by assuming
that there are nine types of participants, who differ on how they score along two dimensions: the
intrinsic cost of lying, and the cost of finding out new payoffs. More precisely, assume that each
participant can be classified by two individual variables λ and τ , where λ is the intrinsic cost of
lying and τ is the cost of finding out new payoffs. The cost of lying is paid only if a participant
lies; the cost of finding out new payoffs is paid only if a participant finds out new payoffs. Apart
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from (possibly) paying these costs, we assume that participants aim at maximizing their material
payoff. Let us assume that λ and τ can assume only three values, that we denote l (for low), m (for
medium), and h (for high). For the sake of the informal argument, we assume that l is essentially
equal to 0, and we assume that h is “high enough”, meaning that a person with h cost of lying will
always tell the truth and a person with h cost of finding out payoffs will report a position without
finding out any of the payoffs. Therefore, we obtain a subdivision in 9 types as follows:
• (l, l) participants do not pay any cost for lying and pay no cost for finding out payoffs. In this
case, the participant knows that s/he might lie, therefore, the best strategy is to find out all
the payoffs and then report the position corresponding to the global maximum.
• (l,m) participants do not pay any cost for lying and they pay a medium cost for finding out
payoffs. Therefore, the best strategy for these participants is to read part of the list and then
report the position corresponding to the maximum of the sub-list that they have read.
• (l, h) participants do not pay any cost for lying, but they pay a high cost for finding out payoffs.
Therefore, these participants do not find out any payoff and report a random position.
• (m, l) participants have medium cost of lying and pay no cost for finding out payoffs. In this
case, the participant knows that s/he might lie, therefore, the best strategy is to find out
all the payoffs and then lie only if the difference between the global maximal payoff and the
payoff corresponding to telling the truth is greater than the cost of lying.
• (m,m) participants pay a medium cost for lying and a medium cost for finding out payoffs.
Therefore, these participants will read part of the list and then, if they find a very high payoff
in the part of the list that they have read, they lie, otherwise they tell the truth (observe that
participants may or may not know the payoff corresponding to telling the truth; if they know
it, clearly, the larger this payoff, the less likely will they be to lie). The best strategy will
depend on M and will be computed exactly in section 6.4.
• (m,h) participants pay a medium cost for lying and a high cost for finding out payoffs.
Therefore, the best strategy for these participants is to not find out any payoff and tell the
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truth.
• (h, l) participants have high cost of lying and pay no cost for finding out payoffs. These
participants know that they will tell the truth regardless of its payoff. Moreover, since the
cost of finding out payoffs is zero, these participants find out the payoffs up to a random
position, and then report the truth regardless of the payoffs that they have found out.
• (h,m) participants pay a high cost for lying and a medium cost for finding out payoffs.
These participants would, in principle, read part of the list and then report the true position,
regardless of the payoffs that they have read. Since the cost of finding out new payoffs is
not zero and since these participants already know that they will tell truth, then their best
strategy is to report the truth without finding out any payoff.
• (h, h) participants pay a high cost for lying and a high cost for finding out payoffs. The best
strategy for these participants is to not find out any payoff and report the truth.
We note that this classification easily explains our results. Result 1 holds essentially by definition,
because the cost of lying does not depend on the magnitude of the lie. Therefore, whenever a
participant lies, he does so to maximize the payoff (globally, if he found out all the payoffs; locally,
if he found out only some payoffs). Result 2 (a substantial proportion of people report the truth
without first finding out the corresponding payoff) comes from participants in the (m,h), (h,m),
and (h, h) classes; Result 3 (among those finding out the payoff corresponding to telling the truth,
luck has a positive effect) comes from participants in the (m, l) class; and Result 4 (if there is a
high payoff at the beginning of the list, a substantial proportion of people report the corresponding
position) comes from the (m,m) class. Of course, we are not saying that all these nine classes are
non-empty, or that they have the same density (for example, since we found no evidence of random
play, the class (l, h) is likely to be empty, or negligible). The only point that we want to make is
that this is a relatively simple way to explain our results, and that we can use it as guiding idea to
develop the formal model.
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6.3 The model
Here we introduce the formal model. We use a sequential problem in which, at each stage, a
participant has to decide between reporting a position, or finding out the payoff corresponding to
the next position. Finding out a payoff has a cost (that might be 0), so as it has a cost to lie (that
might be 0, as well).
More precisely, we consider a sequential decision problem as follows. At time t0 = 0, participant
p is given the following pieces of information:
• A private state of the world pig ∈ Π = {pi1, pi2, . . . , pin}, where Π is a finite set representing the
potential states of the world. In our experiments, Π is the set of all positions and pig is the
actual position given to p. At time t = 0, p need not know the exact composition of the set
Π. For example, in our experiments participants do not initially know the length of the list
of potential payoffs.
• A set m(Π) of cardinality ≤ n of potential material payoffs (expressed in some unit of mea-
surement, e.g., cents). At time t = 0, p knows that each payoff is drawn at random from the
set {1, 2, . . . ,M}, where M is a positive integer (in our experiments M = 90 cents).
At time t0 = 0, p can decide between two options: reporting a state of the world without knowing
any payoff, or paying a cost to find out the payoff corresponding to the first state of the world.
More precisely, the two available options at time t0 = 0 are:
• Option R0. Report a state of the world pir at time t = 0. The participant p can either report
the state of the world truthfully (pir = pig) or not (pir 6= pig). We assume that participants
have a moral cost of lying (that might be 0). We include the moral cost of lying into a utility
function taking inspiration by Krupka & Weber (2013). More precisely, we define the expected
utility of reporting pir at time t0 = 0 to be:
Up(pir, pig, 0) =
M + 1
2
− λ(p)(1− χpir,pig),
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where
χpir,pig =

1, if pir = pig
0, if pir 6= pig
The individual parameter λ(p) ≥ 0 represents the intrinsic cost of lying, which we assume
to be an integer. We assume that (for virtually all participants) λ does not depend on the
magnitude of the lie, because Result 1 suggests that very few people stretch the truth. The
interpretation of λ(p) is clear: p lies if the benefit of lying is greater than λ(p); if the benefit
of lying is equal to λ(p), then p is indifferent. So, the expected utility of reporting pir at time
t0 = 0 is equal to the expected payoff of choosing to report a state of the world knowing that
its corresponding payoff is drawn at random from the set {1, 2, . . . ,M}, minus the intrinsic
cost of lying, which is paid only when p indeed lies (i.e., pir 6= pig). Thus, the term M+12
comes from the fact that, at time t0 = 0, p does not know any of the payoffs and therefore p’s
expected monetary payoff from reporting pir is
M+1
2
, independently of pir ∈ Π.
• Option F0. Choose to pay a cost τ1(p) to find out the first payoff m(pi1) at time t1. We assume
that the cost τ1(p) ≥ 0 is a integer parameter, depending only on the participant.
And so on, at time t = 1, 2, . . . (we assume that time is discrete), if p has not chosen to report a
state of the world pir at time t− 1, then p will have to choose between two options:
• Option Rt. Report a state of the world pir at time t. The expected utility of reporting pir at
time t is defined as:
Up(pir, pig, t) = E(pir, pit)− λ(p)(1− χpir,pig)− τ1(p)− . . .− τt(p),
where the expected material payoff E(pir, pit) of reporting pir after finding out t payoffs is:
E(pir, pit) =

m(pir), if t ≥ r
M+1
2
, if t < r
The interpretation of E(pir, pit) is obvious. If t < r, then p does not know, at time t, the material
payoff corresponding to reporting pir. Therefore, reporting pir at time t < r has expected
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material payoff M+1
2
. Else if t ≥ r, then p knows, at time t, the material payoff corresponding
to reporting pir. Therefore, in this case, the expected material payoff of reporting pir at time
t is equal to the actual payoff associate to pir, which is m(pir).
• Option Ft. Choose to pay a cost τt+1(p) to find out the payoff m(pit+1) at time t + 1. We
assume that τt+1(p) ≥ τt(p). This property will be used in the proofs. We believe it to be
a reasonable assumption, coming from the observation that memorizing t + 1 payoffs may
require more cognitive effort than memorizing t payoffs.
Our goal is to analyze the strategies that maximize people’s expected utility. To this end, we
will make the following two assumptions:
1. Players are risk neutral
2. Players are rational
The first assumption is technically useful, but it does not change the core of the argument:
the model can be easily adapted to risk averse (or risk seeking) players, by adding an additional
parameter, which, everything else being equal, will make these players less (or more) likely to find
out a new payoff. The second assumption is the standard assumption of rationality in game theory.
In our case, it implies that, at time t− 1, p decides to find out m(pit) only if the expected utility of
finding out m(pit) and deciding to report a state of the world at time t is greater than the utility of
reporting a state of the world at time t− 1. Indeed, at time t− 1, p always prefer to find out m(pit)
and choose to report a position at time t over finding out m(pit) and then choosing to not report a
position at time t (because, in the latter case, p will have to pay the additional cost τt+1 to find out
the next payoff).
6.4 Analysis
We start by discussing the model in two extreme cases: τ1(p) = τ2(p) = . . . = 0 and λ(p) = 0.
Then we move to the general analysis. Here we report only the propositions along with a brief
description. We refer to the Appendix for the proofs.
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6.4.1 Case τ1(p) = τ2(p) = . . . = 0
We make one technical assumption in order to avoid listing a number of trivial subcases, that differ
from one another in only minor details. Specifically, let M = maxi=1,...,nm(pii), we assume that
M < M . This assumption guarantees that p has always a non-zero probability of finding out a
payoff larger than those that he has already found out, and therefore p would not stop finding out
payoffs simply because he has found the maximum available payoff. Note that this assumtpion is
satisfied by our experiments, since M = 90, but none of the numbers in the list of potential payoffs
is equal to 90.
Proposition 1. Let p be a participant with τ1(p) = . . . = τn(p) = 0. Then:
• If λ(p) > M , that is, if the intrinsic cost of lying is greater than the maximal payoff, p
maximizes their utility by finding out a random number of payoffs and by reporting the true
state of the world, regardless of the payoffs that p has found out;
• If λ(p) ≤M , p maximizes their utility by finding out all payoffs (note that this includes M),
and then:
– reporting the truth, if m(pig) > M − λ(p);
– reporting a state of the world pi such that m(pi) = M , if m(pig) < M − λ(p);
– reporting a state of the world chosen at random between pig and pi such that m(pi) = M ,
if m(pig) = M − λ(p).
The intuition behind this proposition is very simple. The case λ(p) > M is trivial: p knows that
no material payoff would counterbalance the intrinsic cost of lying, therefore p will always tell the
truth, after finding out a random number of payoffs (because p does not pay any cost for finding out
payoffs). Else, if λ(p) ≤M , then p might lie depending on the payoffs. The fact that p does not pay
any cost for finding out payoffs and the fact that there is always a non-zero probability of finding
out a larger payoff, imply that p’s best strategy is to find out all payoffs before reporting a state
of the world. At this point, p will report the truth or the state of the world corresponding to the
maximum payoff, depending on the cost of lying: if the cost of lying is above a certain threshold,
27
6.4 Analysis 6 MODEL
then p will tell the truth; if the cost of lying is below that threshold, p will lie; if the cost of lying
is equal to the threshold, p will be indifferent between telling the truth or lying.
6.4.2 Case λ(p) = 0
The case λ(p) = 0 (that is, p has no cost of lying) is intuitively simple. Since p has no cost of
lying, then p will find out some payoffs (depending on τt(p)) and then will report a position that
maximizes their (possibly expected) material payoff.
To formalize this idea, we need to compute the time at which p stops finding out new payoffs. To
do so, let Mt = max1,2,...,t{m(pi1), . . . ,m(pit), bM+12 c}, where bxc denote the highest integer which is
smaller or equal than x. Observe that the sum 1
M
(∑M
k=Mt+1
k
)
is weakly decreasing as t increases,
while the sequence τt(p), by assumption, is weakly increasing in t. It follows that, if there is a t
such that
1
M
(
M∑
k=Mt+1
k
)
≥ τt, for all t ≤ t and 1
M
(
M∑
k=Mt+1
k
)
< τt, for all t > t
then t is unique. We introduce the following notation: if t as just defined exists, we set tlast = t; if,
instead, t does not exist, we set tlast = n.
Proposition 2. Suppose that λ(p) = 0. The strategy that maximizes p’s utility is to first find out
all payoffs up to tlast and then report a state of the world according to the following three cases:
1. if tlast < n and m(pii) <
M+1
2
, for all i ≤ tlast, then p maximizes their utility by reporting a
state of the world, pir, chosen at random among those for which r > t
last;
2. if tlast < n and there exists a pii, with i ≤ tlast, such that m(pii) ≥ M+12 , then player p maximizes
their utility by reporting a state of the world pir such thatm(pir) = maxi=1,...,tlastm(pii) = Mtlast .
3. if tlast = n then player p maximizes their utility by reporting a state of the world, pir, such
that m(pir) = maxi=1,...,nm(pii) = M .
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6.4.3 General case: λ(p) > 0 and τt(p) > 0, for all t
Now we analyze the model for λ(p) > 0 and τt(p) > 0, for all t. (Clearly, the case τt(p) = 0 up to
some t < n, and τt(p) > 0, for t > t will be a combination of the previous case and this general
case). Moreover, since p will always be a fixed player, to simplify the notation, we will write λ
instead of λ(p) and τt instead of τt(p).
We start by looking at what happen at time t0 = 0. We keep this case separated from the
general case for two reasons. One is technical: at time t0 = 0, p does not know any of the payoffs,
and therefore the details are slightly different than in the case t > 0, in which p knows at least one
payoff. The other one is conceptual, because we want to explicitly show that there are values of λ
and τ such that people report the truth at time t0, and this would be consistent with the analysis
in Section 6.1, which suggests that not only there is a proportion of participants who report the
truth without first finding out its corresponding payoff, but there is even a proportion of people
who report the truth without finding out any payoff.
Proposition 3. It is optimal for participant p to report the true state of the world pig at time
t0 = 0 if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
• λ ≥ M+1
2
and τ1 > 0;
• g = 1, λ < M+1
2
and τ1 >
1
M
∑M
k=bM+1
2
c−λ+1
(
k − M+1
2
+ λ
)
;
• g > 1, λ < M+1
2
and τ1 >
1
M
∑M
k=bM+1
2
c+λ+1
(
k − λ− M+1
2
)
.
We remind that, in our two experiments, g > 1. It follows that, according to this proposition,
there are two classes of participants who report the true position without first finding out any payoff:
participants with high cost of lying and non-zero cost of finding out payoffs, and participants with
a medium cost of lying, but a high enough cost of finding out payoffs. This would correspond, in
the informal description of the model in Section 6.2, to (h,m), (h, h) and (m,h) participants.
We can now present the general case. Notice that, if the starting point of a sum is greater than
its ending point, we follow the standard convention and we define the sum to be equal to zero.
Proposition 4. Suppose that p has found out all payoffs up to m(pit), then:
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• p maximizes his expected utility by reporting, at time t, the true state of the world, if one of
the following conditions is satisfied:
– g ≤ t, m(pig) > Mt − λ, and τt+1 > 1M
∑M
k=m(pig)+λ+1
(k − λ−m(pig)); or
– g = t+1, Mt−λ < M+12 , and τt+1 > 1M
∑Mt−λ
k=1
(
Mt − λ− M+12
)
+ 1
M
∑M
k=Mt−λ+1
(
k − M+1
2
)
;
or
– g > t+ 1, Mt − λ < M+12 , and τt+1 > 1M
∑M
k=bM+1
2
c+λ+1
(
k − λ− M+1
2
)
.
• p maximizes his expected utility by reporting, at time t, a state of the world corresponding
to a payoff of Mt (if there is more than one, then p chooses at random among them), if one
of the following conditions is satisfied:
– g ≤ t, m(pig) < Mt − λ, and τt+1 > 1M
∑M
k=m(pig)+λ+1
(k − λ−m(pig)); or
– g = t+1, Mt−λ > M+12 , and τt+1 > 1M
∑Mt−λ
k=1
(
Mt − λ− M+12
)
+ 1
M
∑M
k=Mt−λ+1
(
k − M+1
2
)
;
or
– g > t+ 1, Mt − λ > M+12 , and τt+1 > 1M
∑M
k=bM+1
2
c+λ+1
(
k − λ− M+1
2
)
.
• In all other situations, p maximizes his expected utility by paying, at time t, a cost τt+1 to
find out m(pit+1) at time t+ 1.
6.4.4 The predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical results
We conclude by observing that the previous propositions are consistent with the qualitative empir-
ical results listed in Section 6.1.
Consistency with Result 1
All propositions above affirm that the state of the world that maximizes participants’ expected
utility is either the true state of the world, or a state of the world that maximizes the payoff of a
sublist of the shape {m(pi1), . . . ,m(pit)}, with t ≤ n.
This is broadly consistent with Result 1. In particular, the fact that the model predicts that no
one stretches the truth ultimately follows from the assumption that the cost of lying λ(p) does not
30
6.4 Analysis 6 MODEL
depend on some distance between the lie and the truth. Had we assumed that λ(p) depends on the
magnitude of the lie, the predictions would have been different. Our empirical data show that a
small proportion (less than 5%) of subjects stretch the truth. These subjects can be covered by the
model by assuming that, for these subjects, the cost of lying depends on the distance between the
lie and the truth.
Consistency with Result 2
Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 show that there are values of λ(p) and τ(p) for which it is in p’s
best interest to report the truth without finding out the corresponding payoff. This is consistent
with Result 2.
We note, additionally, that Proposition 3 shows that there are values of λ(p) and τ(p) for which
it is in p’s best interest to report the truth without finding out any payoff. This is consistent with
the analysis in Section 6.4 regarding Study 2, which shows that the average response time of people
who report the true position and declare that they have not read the list is smaller than the average
response time of people who report Position 2 (remember that, in Study 2, Position 2 corresponds
to a high local maximum), suggesting that the people who report the true position and declare that
they have not read the list, did not even start reading the list.
Consistency with Result 3
The third result states that, among subjects who find out the payoff corresponding to telling the
truth, m(pig), this payoff has a positive effect on honesty.
To see whether this result is consistent with the model, we have to look at two separate cases,
depending on whether the costs of finding out payoffs are all zero or not.
If τ1(p) = . . . = τn(p) = 0, Proposition 1 guarantees that the greater m(pig) is, the more likely is
p to report the truth, which is indeed consistent with Result 3.
Else if τi(p) > 0, for some i that we can assume to be, without loss of generality, equal to 1, we
have to look at Proposition 4, case g ≤ t (i.e., p has found out all payoffs up to at least m(pig)).
In this case, we note that the condition for reporting the truth depends on m(pit) in such a way
that, when m(pit) increases, the condition is more likely to be satisfied. Thus, also this proposition
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predicts a positive effect of m(pig) on honesty among subjects who found m(pig) out.
Consistency with Result 4
Result 4 states that, if there is a high potential payoff (but smaller than the global maximum) at
the beginning of the list, then a significant proportion of subjects report the position corresponding
to this high payoff.
To see whether this result is consistent with the model, we have to distinguish two cases, de-
pending on whether the cost of lying of a participant is equal to zero or not.
If λ(p) = 0, Proposition 2 states that p reports a state of the world corresponding to the
maximum of the sublist {m(pi1), . . . ,m(pitlast)}. Now, remember that what we denoted as tlast
depends negatively on Mt = max{m(pi1), . . . ,m(pit), bM+12 c}. Therefore, putting a high potential
payoff at the beginning of the list, makes Mt increase, which in turn makes t
last decrease and, by
Proposition 2, makes p more likely to report the position corresponding to Mt.
Else if λ(p) > 0, Proposition 4 states that p reports a state of the world corresponding to Mt if
certain conditions are satisfied. We need to show that these conditions depend positively on Mt,
that is, larger Mt’s make these conditions more likely to be satisfied. Three of these conditions
(m(pig) < Mt − λ, Mt − λ > M+12 , and Mt − λ > M+12 ), obviously depend positively on Mt. The
only non-trivial condition is
τt+1 >
1
M
Mt−λ∑
k=1
(
Mt − λ− M + 1
2
)
+
1
M
M∑
k=Mt−λ+1
(
k − M + 1
2
)
.
To show that this condition depends positively on Mt, we have to show that its right hand side
decreases with Mt. Note that, when passing from Mt to Mt+1, the first summand of the right hand
side increases by (Mt−λ− M+12 )/M , while its second summand decreases by (Mt−λ+1− M+12 )/M.
Since the decrease of the right hand side is greater than its increase, then, overall, the right hand
side decreases as Mt goes to Mt + 1. This implies that the right hand side decreases with Mt, as
wanted.
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7 Discussion
Previous work studied (dis)honesty in situations in which the decision maker knows the economic
consequences of lying vs telling the truth (e.g., die-under-cup paradigm) or in situations in which
any uncertainty about these consequences cannot be cleared in anyway (e.g., Sender-Receiver game).
However, in reality, people often know that they will have a chance to lie, they do not initially know
the economic consequences of the available choices, but they can invest time to find them out.
The first goal of this work is to capture the core of this kind of situations by means of a novel
decision problem. Participants are initially given a list of potential payoffs and a position on this
list. The position is their private information. Participants are told that their job is to report their
position and that they will be paid an amount of money equal to the payoff in the position they
report. Therefore, participants can lie by reporting a position corresponding to a payoff higher than
the payoff in their given position.
We conducted two experiments, which provided evidence of four major results: (i) Very few
participants stretch the truth, that is, the vast majority of participants either report the true position
or a position that is not adjacent to the true position - in this latter case, they almost always report
a position corresponding to a maximum (either global or local); (ii) There is a significant proportion
of participants who report the true position without first finding out its corresponding payoff; (iii)
Among the participants who find out the payoff corresponding to reporting the true position, this
payoff has a positive effect on honesty; (iv) If there is a high potential payoff (but smaller than the
global maximum) at the beginning of the list, a significant proportion of participants report the
position corresponding to that high payoff.
These results suggest that participants vary in (at least) two dimensions: the intrinsic cost of
lying, and the cost of finding out new payoffs.
Starting from this observation, we built a model in which participants have to decide at what
time tlast to stop finding out payoffs, and what position pir to report. The utility is assumed to
depend on the (expected) material payoff corresponding to reporting a position at a given time, on
whether they lie or not (if so, they pay the intrinsic cost of lying), and on the cost of finding out
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the payoffs. We have shown that this model is consistent with the four empirical results.
Therefore, our work makes a step forward with respect to previous research from both the empir-
ical and the theoretical viewpoints. Empirically, we reported the first studies exploring dishonesty
in situations in which people know that they will have a chance to lie, they do not initially know
the economic consequences of the available actions, but they can invest time to find them out.
Theoretically, we proposed a model that is consistent with observed behavior in these situations.
Additionally, our results contribute also to the debate on whether the intrinsic cost of lying
depend on the magnitude of the lie or not. Mazar, Amir and Ariely (2008) and Fischbacher and
Fo¨lmi-Heusi (2013) advanced the hypothesis that the marginal cost of the lie is increasing in the
magnitude of the lie, which implies that people might lie a bit, but not maximally. Gneezy et al.
(2018) recently found that most people lie maximally, but there are also people who lie partially,
and this partly depends on whether reputation is at stake. Our results are broadly in line with
this view. In our experiments, most liars lied maximally, but there was also small proportion of
participants stretching the truth (below 5%).
Finally, our results also contribute to the debate on whether honesty is intuitive or deliberative.
Indeed, we have also conducted a time pressure study (analyzed in the Appendix). This is a
significant contribution in itself, because the role of time pressure and, more generally, the role
of intuition on honesty has been at the center of the debate in the last years (Andersen et al.,
2018; Cappelen et al., 2013; Capraro, 2017; Capraro et al., 2019; Debey et al., 2012; Gino et al.,
2011; Gunia et al., 2012; Lohse et al., 2018; Mead et al., 2009; Shalvi et al., 2012; Spence et al.,
2001; Van’t Veer et al., 2014; Walczyk et al., 2003), as a part of the more general research program
of classifying social behaviors according to whether they are intuitive or reflective (Capraro and
Cococcioni, 2015, 2016; Capraro et al., 2017; Corgnet et al., 2015; Lotz, 2015; Rand et al., 2012,
2014, 2016; Rand, 2016). In our case, time pressure has no effect on the overall rate of honesty.
However, it does have an effect on the distribution of choices: (i) it transforms some would-be global
maximizers into local-maximizers, and (ii) it generates a small proportion of confused subjects.
In sum, we introduced a novel decision problem to study dishonesty in situations in which people
know that they will have a chance to lie, they do not initially know the economic consequences of
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lying vs telling the truth, but they can invest time to find them out. We also introduced a model,
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A Experimental instructions
We report only the instructions of Study 1. Those of Study 2 were the same, a part from the
differences in the list and in the self-report question discussed in Section 5.
Screen 1
Welcome to this HIT.
This is an anonymous HIT. It will take about ten minutes. For your participation, you will
earn 50c and some additional money to be determined later.
Screen 2
In the next screens, you will generate two pieces of information:
• A POSITION, which will be a number, for example 14
• A LIST of potential bonuses between 1 and 90 cents, such as:
23 73 34 22 2 11 54 21 44 3 22 6 89 45 67 23 65 46 77 1 86 5 4
Your bonus for this HIT will be the one in the position you generated. Thus, in this case, it will
be 45c, because 45 is in position 14.
What is your job?
REPORT the POSITION you generated.
IMPORTANT: This survey is anonymous. We do not know the position that you will generate.
We now ask some comprehension questions in order to ascertain that you understood the situa-
tion.
Assume that you generate:
POSITION: 13
LIST: 35 24 36 82 14 3 29 21 55 64 35 33 67 2 13 21 65 46 8 43 32
What position did you generate? (blank text box where to type the answer below the question)
What would be your bonus if you report the position you generated? (blank text box where to
type the answer below the question)
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What position could you report if you wanted to earn a bigger bonus? (blank text box where
to type the answer below the question)
Screen 3
Assume that you generate:
POSITION: 9
LIST: 53 8 24 27 76 61 65 14 34 25 22 33 73 68 86 2 13 25 71 78 63 27 51 11
What position did you generate? (blank text box where to type the answer below the question)
What would be your bonus if you report the position you generated? (blank text box where to
type the answer below the question)
What position could you report if you wanted to earn a bigger bonus? (blank text box where
to type the answer below the question)
Screen 4
Congratulations, you have passed all comprehension questions.
In the next screen, you will generate a POSITION. In the screen after, you will generate a
SEQUENCE of potential bonuses and you will be asked to report the POSITION you generated.
Remember that you will receive a payment in cents equal to the number in the position you report.
Screen 5 (Unlucky condition)
POSITION: 19
Please take note of this position on a piece of paper.
Now click the next button in order to generate a sequence.
Screen 5 (Lucky condition)
POSITION: 22
Please take note of this position on a piece of paper.
Now click the next button in order to generate a sequence.
Screen 6
LIST:
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25 3 63 54 28 70 37 36 26 31 43 15 30 60 33 37 15 63 16 50 4 71 79 2 85 48
What POSITION did you generate?
(blank text box where to type the answer here)
(The Time Pressure condition differed from this condition only in that right after the list and
right before asking participants “What POSITION did you generate?”, we added the sentence:
REPLY WITHIN 15 SECONDS. OTHERWISE YOU WON’T GET ANY BONUS”.)
B Analysis of the Time Pressure condition
Here we analyze the effect of time pressure on honesty. A manipulation check confirms that subjects
under time pressure took much shorter to make a decision than subjects who decided with no time
constraint (13.8s vs 24.4s, ranksum: p < .001).
Overall, we find that the rate of honesty under time pressure is very similar to the rate of honesty
without time constraint (82.3% vs 84.1%). Logit regression predicting Honesty (dummy variable)
as a function of Condition (Time Pressure vs No Time Constraint) confirms that the rate of honesty
in the two conditions are not significantly different (without control on sex, age, education: coeff
= −0.123, z = −0.64, p = 0.524; with control: coeff = −0.156, z = −0.78, p = 0.437). This remains
true when we split the sample in the Lucky versus Unlucky condition. In the Lucky condition the
rates of honesty in the Time Pressure and in the No Time Constraint conditions were, respectively,
85.9% and 91.4% (logit regression without control: coeff = 0.567, z = −1.60, p = 0.109; with
control: coeff = −0.560, z = −1.58, p = 0.115). In the Unlucky condition, the rates od honesty in
the Time Pressure and in the No Time Constraint conditions were, respectively, 78.9% and 77.6%
(logit regression without control: coeff = 0.076, z = 0.30, p = 0.765; with control: coeff = 0.063, z
= 0.24, p = 0.808).
Therefore, time pressure has no effect on the overall rate of honesty. However, although time
pressure has no effect on the rate of honesty, we find that it has the effect of changing the distribution
of positions (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p = 0.038). Where does this effect come from, if the overall rate
of honesty is constant across time manipulation conditions? Table 1 summarizes the distribution
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of choices in the Time Pressure and in the No Time Constraint condition. The number of honest
choices is essentially the same in the Time Pressure and in the No Time Constraint (294 vs 291),
so is the same the number of people stretching the truth (5 people in each condition). The only
difference between the Time Pressure condition and the No Time Constraint condition is given by:
(i) many of the people who would choose the global maximum in the No Time Constraint condition
end up choosing an early local maximum in the Time Pressure condition (arguably because they
have no time to find out all the payoffs up to the global maximum); (ii) twelve participants are not
classifiable (arguably because some subjects get confused by the time pressure).
Table 1: Distributions of the reported positions in the Time Pressure and in the No Time Constraint
conditions of Study 1.
Time Pressure No Time Constraint
# honest 294 291
# choosing global max 12 43
# choosing local max 34 5
# stretching the truth 5 5
# not classifiable in one of the above 12 0
C Proofs
Proposition 1. Let p be a participant with τ1(p) = . . . = τn(p) = 0. Then:
• If λ(p) > M , that is, if the intrinsic cost of lying is greater than the maximal payoff, p
maximizes their utility by finding out a random number of payoffs and by reporting the true
state of the world, regardless of the payoffs that p has found out;
• If λ(p) ≤M , p maximizes their utility by finding out all payoffs (note that this includes M),
and then:
– reporting the truth, if m(pig) > M − λ(p);
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– reporting a state of the world pi such that m(pi) = M , if m(pig) < M − λ(p);
– reporting a state of the world chosen at random between pig and pi such that m(pi) = M ,
if m(pig) = M − λ(p).
Proof Since p pays no cost to find out new payoffs, then for p it is optimal to find out all pay-
offs8. Now, after finding out all payoffs, if p reports the true state of the world, pig, then p gets
a utility of m(pig). If p reports a state of the world pi such that m(pi) = M , then p gets a utility
U(pi) = M − λ, if pi 6= pig, and U(pi) = M , if pi = pig. If p reports a state pi′ 6= pi, pig, then p gets a
utility U(pi′) < U(pi). Thus, p will either tell the truth or lie maximally. No other state of the world
maximize p’s utility. Moreover, if m(pig) > M−λ(p), then p reports the truth; if m(pig) < M−λ(p),
then p lies maximally, by reporting pi; if m(pig) = M − λ(p), then p is indifferent between reporting
the truth and lying maximally. 
Proposition 2. Suppose that λ(p) = 0. The strategy that maximizes p’s utility is to first find out
all payoffs up to tlast and then report a state of the world according to the following three cases:
1. if tlast < n and m(pii) <
M+1
2
, for all i ≤ tlast, then p maximizes their utility by reporting a
state of the world, pir, chosen at random among those for which r > t
last;
2. if tlast < n and there exists a pii, with i ≤ tlast, such that m(pii) ≥ M+12 , then player p maximizes
their utility by reporting a state of the world pir such thatm(pir) = maxi=1,...,tlastm(pii) = Mtlast .
3. if tlast = n then player p maximizes their utility by reporting a state of the world, pir, such
that m(pir) = maxi=1,...,nm(pii) = M .
Proof
8There are some extreme cases in which p has also other optimal strategies, but they also lead p to either tell
the truth or lie maximally. More precisely, if λ(p) is large enough, then p is indifferent between finding out a new
payoff and reporting the truth; if one of the payoffs is equal to M , the maximal potential value, then p is indifferent
between reporting the state of the world corresponding to M and finding out a new payoff. In any case, p either
reports the truth or lie maximally.
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It is clear that p finds out all the payoffs until time tlast and reports a state of the world at time
tlast. Which state of the world, pir, will p report will depend on the payoffs found out up to time
tlast, and on tlast itself. Specifically, we distinguish three cases:
1. if tlast < n and m(pii) < (M+1)/2, for all i ≤ tlast, then choosing to report a state of the world
pir at random among those whose associated payoff has not been found out yet (r > t
last), will
give p an expected utility of (M + 1)/2, which is strictly larger that any m(pii) < (M + 1)/2,
with i ≤ tlast. Thus, the choice that maximizes p’s utility is to choose to report at random a
state of the world pir, with r > t
last.
2. If tlast < n and there exists a pii, with i ≤ tlast, such that m(pii) ≥ (M +1)/2, then choosing to
report a state of the world pir at random among those whose associated payoff has not been
found out yet (r > tlast), will give p an expected utility of (M+1)/2, which is smaller or equal
than the utility that p would get by reporting pir such that m(pir) = maxi=1,...,tlastm(pii) =
Mtlast .
3. If tlast = n, then p has found out all payoffs and then p maximizes their utility by reporting
a state of the world corresponding to the maximum payoff M .

Proposition 3. It is optimal for participant p to report the true state of the world pig at time
t0 = 0 if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
• λ ≥ M+1
2
and τ1 > 0;
• g = 1, λ < M+1
2
and τ1 >
1
M
∑M
k=bM+1
2
c−λ+1
(
k − M+1
2
+ λ
)
;
• g > 1, λ < M+1
2
and τ1 >
1
M
∑M
k=bM+1
2
c+λ+1
(
k − λ− M+1
2
)
.
Proof Suppose that p decides to report a state of the world at time t0 = 0. Then p obtains their
maximal utility by reporting the true position pig, which gives an expected utility of
M+1
2
, which is
greater than the expected utility of lying, which, at time t0 = 0, is
M+1
2
− λ.
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Now, the expected utility of finding out m(pi1) and deciding at time t1 = 1 will clearly depend on
whether g = 1 or not (which is a piece of information known to p). So, we distinguish the following
two sub-cases.
Case g = 1
If g = 1, the utility corresponding to the optimal strategy at time t1 is equal to max(
M+1
2
− λ−
τ1,m(pi1)− τ1). We first consider the case in which this max is equal to M+12 −λ− τ1. This happens
whenever m(pi1) ≤ M+12 − λ, which happens with probability 1M max
(bM+1
2
− λc, 0), where bxc is
the floor of x, that is, the largest integer that is smaller than or equal to x. Thus the expected
payoff at time t0 = 0 of finding out m(pi1) at time t1 = 1 is:
1
M
max
(
bM + 1
2
c − λ, 0
)(
M + 1
2
− λ− τ1
)
+
1
M
M∑
k=max(bM+12 c−λ,0)+1
(k − τ1)
Now:
• If M+1
2
− λ ≤ 0, then this utility is equal to 1
M
∑M
k=1(k − τ1) = M+12 − τ1, which is clearly
strictly smaller than the best payoff of deciding at time t0 = 0, which is
M+1
2
, because τ1 > 0.
Thus, in this case, the best strategy of player p is not to find out any payoff and report the
truth at time t0 = 0.
• If M+1
2
−λ > 0, instead of using the formula above, we do a cost-to-benefit analysis, as follows.
At time t0, choosing to pay a cost τ1 to find out m(pi1) costs, indeed, τ1. As for the benefit,
finding out m(pi1) and deciding at time t1 = 1 is profitable only when m(pi1) >
M+1
2
− λ, in
which case the payoff is m(pi1) instead of
M+1
2
− λ. Thus, the benefit is
1
M
M∑
k=bM+1
2
c−λ+1
(k − M + 1
2
+ λ).
Thus, according to this cost-benefit analysis and using the assumption that p is risk neutral,
we obtain that p decides to find out m(pi1) iff:
τ1 ≤ 1
M
M∑
k=bM+1
2
c−λ+1
(
k − M + 1
2
+ λ
)
.
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Case g > 1
Finding out m(pi1) and deciding at time t1 = 1 costs τ1 and it is a profitable deviation from
choosing to report pig at time t0 = 0 iff m(pi1)−λ > M+12 , in which case p gets a utility of m(pi1)−λ
instead of M+1
2
. Thus, the cost-benefit analysis corresponds to the condition:
τ1 ≤ 1
M
M∑
k=bM+1
2
c+λ+1
(
k − λ− M + 1
2
)
Note that if λ ≥ M+1
2
the previous inequality is never satisfied, because the sum in the right
hand side is empty. This extreme case is thus identical to the one for g = 1.

Proposition 4. Suppose that p has found out all payoffs up to m(pit), then:
• p maximizes his expected utility by reporting, at time t, the true state of the world, if one of
the following conditions is satisfied:
– g ≤ t, m(pig) > Mt − λ, and τt+1 > 1M
∑M
k=m(pig)+λ+1
(k − λ−m(pig)); or
– g = t+1, Mt−λ < M+12 , and τt+1 > 1M
∑Mt−λ
k=1
(
Mt − λ− M+12
)
+ 1
M
∑M
k=Mt−λ+1
(
k − M+1
2
)
;
or
– g > t+ 1, Mt − λ < M+12 , and τt+1 > 1M
∑M
k=bM+1
2
c+λ+1
(
k − λ− M+1
2
)
.
• p maximizes his expected utility by reporting, at time t, a state of the world corresponding
to a payoff of Mt (if there is more than one, then p chooses at random among them), if one
of the following conditions is satisfied:
– g ≤ t, m(pig) < Mt − λ, and τt+1 > 1M
∑M
k=m(pig)+λ+1
(k − λ−m(pig)); or
– g = t+1, Mt−λ > M+12 , and τt+1 > 1M
∑Mt−λ
k=1
(
Mt − λ− M+12
)
+ 1
M
∑M
k=Mt−λ+1
(
k − M+1
2
)
;
or
– g > t+ 1, Mt − λ > M+12 , and τt+1 > 1M
∑M
k=bM+1
2
c+λ+1
(
k − λ− M+1
2
)
.
• In all other situations, p maximizes his expected utility by paying, at time t, a cost τt+1 to
find out m(pit+1) at time t+ 1.
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Proof Suppose that p has found out all payoffs up to m(pit), for some t < n. Let us denote
Mt = max(m(pi1),m(pi2), . . . ,m(pit),
M+1
2
).
We distinguish three cases, depending on whether g ≤ t, g = t+ 1 or g > t+ 1.
• If g ≤ t, then p’s maximal utility at time t is max(m(pig)− τ1− . . .− τt,Mt−λ− τ1− . . .− τt).
Thus, we distinguish two subcases:
– If m(pig) ≥Mt− λ, then, at time t, p’s maximal utility is m(pig)− τ1− . . .− τt, while, at
time t+1, p’s maximal utility is max(m(pig)−τ1− . . .−τt+1,m(pit+1)−λ−τ1− . . .−τt+1).
Thus, the cost of finding out m(pit+1) is smaller than the benefit iff
τt+1 ≤ 1
M
M∑
k=m(pig)+λ+1
(k − λ−m(pig))
Under these circumstances, it clearly follows that lucky participants, as well as those
with a high cost of lying, are more likely to tell the truth at time t, without finding out
the payoff corresponding to time t+ 1.
– If m(pig) < Mt−λ, then, at time t, p’s maximal utility is Mt−λ− τ1− . . .− τt, while, at
time t+1, p’s maximal utility is max(Mt−λ−τ1− . . .−τt+1,m(pit+1)−λ−τ1− . . .−τt+1).
Thus, p decide to find out m(pit+1) iff
τt+1 ≤ 1
M
M∑
k=Mt+1
(k −Mt).
From this case, it clearly follows that the larger Mt is, the more likely it will be for p to
stop.
• If g = t+1, then, at time t, p’s maximal utility is max(Mt−λ−τ1−. . .−τt, M+12 −τ1−. . .−τt).
Thus, we distinguish two subcases:
– if Mt− λ ≤ M+12 , then p’s maximal utility at time t is M+12 − τ1− . . .− τt, while, at time
t+1, p’s maximal utility is equal to max(m(pit+1)−τ1− . . .−τt+1,Mt−λ−τ1− . . .−τt+1).
Therefore, finding out m(pit+1) is a profitable deviation from choosing to report the truth
at time t iff
τt+1 ≤ 1
M
Mt−λ∑
k=1
(
Mt − λ− M + 1
2
)
+
1
M
M∑
k=Mt−λ+1
(
k − M + 1
2
)
.
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– If Mt − λ > M+12 , then p’s maximal utility at time t is Mt − λ− τ1 − . . .− τt, while, at
time t+ 1, p’s maximal utility is max(m(pig)− τ1 − . . .− τt+1,Mt − λ− τ1 − . . .− τt+1).
Therefore, p decides to find out m(pig) iff
τt+1 ≤ 1
M
M∑
k=Mt−λ+1
(k −Mt + λ).
• If g > t+1, then, at time t, p’s maximal utility is max(Mt−λ−τ1−. . .−τt, M+12 −τ1−. . .−τt).
So, we have two subcases:
– If Mt−λ ≤ M+12 , then p’s maximal utility at time t is M+12 − τ1− . . .− τt, while, at time
t+1, p’s maximal expected utility is max(m(pit+1)−λ−τ1−. . .−τt+1, M+12 −τ1−. . .−τt+1).
So, p decides to find out m(pit+1) iff
τt+1 ≤ 1
M
M∑
k=bM+1
2
c+λ+1
(
k − λ− M + 1
2
)
.
– If Mt−λ > M+12 , then p’s maximal utility at time t is Mt−λ−τ1− . . .−τt, while, at time
t+ 1, p’s maximal utility is max(m(pit+1)− λ− τ1 − . . .− τt+1,Mt − λ− τ1 − . . .− τt+1).
So, p decides to find out m(pit+1) iff
τt+1 ≤ 1
M
M∑
k=Mt+1
(k −Mt).

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